Introduction
Land tenure describes how societies manage access to land and resources. There are several forms of land tenure (sometimes called territoriality) practiced by hunter-gatherer societies across the globe. Some groups actively patrol their rigid territorial designations and react violently to those who trespass, while others have found that a social boundary defense is the best recourse. Still other ecological zones don’t allow for any group to actively control access to its resources. Factors such as resource density and resource predictability affect which type of land tenure system will be utilized within a given environment. Discussed below are several aspects of land tenure involving foraging cultures: the Economic-Defensibility model and a case study of its utility, Social-boundary Defense and its counter-example, and Common-pool Resource Areas. These topics are not meant to be a comprehensive list of aspects involving land tenure, they are merely intended to illuminate the diversity experienced within land tenure systems and territoriality of foraging societies.
The Economic-Defensibility Model
Every society has a system of spatial delineation for imposing boundaries on their territory. The permeability of these boundaries varies by society and is influenced by a variety of factors including ecological and cultural variables. People or groups are usually allowed primary access to land through social networks. Primary access is land that can be used by the forager without asking permission of another party. Rather, the forager can allow access to others. This right can be handed down by birthright, through marriage, by trading partners (Netsilik) or even through mythological, totemic history such as among the Australian Aborigines (Kelly 2007).
The Economic-Defensibility Model, first proposed by Dyson-Hudson and Smith in 1978, has been used to describe the ecological factors that drive the variety of land tenure systems demonstrated in foraging societies. Using ecological research on territoriality among foraging animals (particularly primates and seabirds), the researchers hypothesized human territoriality is driven by the cost of defending a resource (i.e. time, energy and risk) relative to the benefit derived from that resource (i.e. the benefit of exclusive access to the resource). These factors are influenced by the density of a resource in a territory and predictability of that resource as illustrated by these figures:
As illustrated, the cost of defending an unpredictable resource in low density leads to increased mobility and less strictly defined territories or group access. On the other extreme, high resource density and high predictability leads to a strict territory system as evidenced by agriculturalists that fiercely defend access to cultivated land as cultivation produces the dense, predictable resources.
The Great Basin Indians: A Case Study of the Economic-Defensibility Model
Using the economic-defensibility model, David Thomas (1981) completed an analysis of three Great-Basin societies: The Reese River Shoshone, the Owens Valley Paiute and the Kawich Mountain Shoshone. Each society was considered in the context of their ecological setting and the density and predictability of resources (particularly pinon nuts) as a way of understanding the land tenure systems of each group.
The Reese River Shoshone rely on pinon nuts in the winter. These are dense and very predictable and thus the people are strictly territorial and will defend their resources and limit access to the territory in the winter. In the summer the Reese River Shoshone gather seeds that are scattered across the region and are not predictable. Thus the people are more willing to share information about the resources of a territory and grant access to those resources as they are difficult to defend and exclusive access to the resource is not hugely beneficial as seeds are abundant. The Kawich Mountain region has limited sources of pinon nuts and thus the Shoshone are foraging less dense and less predictable game and seeds throughout the year and have relatively permeable territories as the people must remain mobile to effectively forage. In the Owens Valley, the Paiute have access to a variety of resources due to abundant streams passing through the region. Relatively permanent villages could be established with ready access to game, fish, roots and pinon nuts and a system of strictly defended territory established. For more information on the Great Basin societies click here.
Below is a diagram from Thomas 1981 that summarizes the relationship between resource density, predictability and territoriality.
As evidenced by this figure, the economic-defensibility model is supported as an effective means of considering the major variables that drive land tenure systems. However, this model does not imply there are only two factors that shape land tenure systems. As demonstrated below, societies often have complex methods of distributing resources. This model is simply a method of taking into account the local ecological factors that affect behavior.
Social-boundary Defense
In the matter of Social-boundary Defense, land and its resources are not fenced off nor owned by one person. The example used by Kelly is that of the Pintupi, a group of Australian Aborigines: "Owners of the country have the right to be asked for use of the resources." (Kelly 2007:193) Permission is almost always granted, but never assumed to be granted.
Ownership status can be transferred in a number of ways, the most obvious being through marriage and consanguineous relationships. The two reasons are cited by Kelly as the most likely reasons for a person to actually ask permission rather than just trespass:
- 1) Insufficient knowledge of the region makes it safer to ask for the owner's permission to use (and information regarding) the land
- 2) Unless the resource can be taken quickly (such as an animal), then one risks retaliation, and this is possibly bad because:
- a) the host group's favor may be required in the near future (variance reduction)
- b) the cost of excluding the person from the host group's region may be too high in relation to the benefit of keeping the resources (tolerated theft)
(Adapted from Kelly 2007:194).
Navajo Land Use and Settlement Patterns
This example is meant to show an instance where fences and other physical boundaries are used to mark ownership, rather than in the case of Social-boundary Defense. (Disclaimer: the Navajo are not a foraging society.)
The situation of the Navajo in the American Southwest is complicated, above everything else, by their being forced to move from their "heartland" in the area of Northwestern Arizona, Western New Mexico, Southern Utah, and Southwestern Colorado. As of 1982, approximately 1300 people from 75 canyon social units (genealogical or geographically defined families) shared the arable farmland in the two-canyon area. For example, several households that share rights to land and cooperate in its usage are considered one unit, whereas two siblings living in separate geographic areas are considered two units (Andrews 1991:45).
Based on oral history from older residents, Andrews actually identified thirteen clan lineages that currently represent the contemporary owners of the land. What comprises a lineage? "Lineages of the same clan are considered distinct when their apical female members are not known to be daughters of the same mother." (Andrews 1991:45). According to Andrews, only 11% of ownership transfers in del Muerto and 17% of ownership transfer in de Chelly were due to immigrant lineages since the mid-1800s (1991:45).
Prior to the "Reservation Period", stockraising - primarily sheep and goats - was the dominant subsistence base, rather than farming, in the area of the San Juan River (Northern New Mexico) and several of its tributaries. This is called Dinétah by the Navajo and the canyons were probably in use by the Navajo by the early 1700s, but by Anasazi even earlier than that. Due to the better farmland being less easily defended by American settlers and Colonel Sumner's forces. It was at this time (mid-1800s) that Sumner reported abundant corn and occasional wheat fields. The fields were destroyed and livestock confiscated as the Navajo were forced to move to Fort Sumner, but it was an overall failure, and in 1868 some families were permitted to move back to the canyons. By 1917, kinship ties and traditional land-use patterns had been reestablished so that farm fields became feasible again (Andrews 1991:47-50).
"The following is a very common grazing pattern—one typical since the resttlement of the de Chelly area after 1868 and the establishment of tribal grazing districts.
- Winter: Livestock are grazed on land nearby the family's rim or Peninsula camp. Occasional trips are made into the canyons to check on campsites and field areas. Cattle may not be moved out of the canyon during the winter months if a family has use-rights to land in the upper reaches of the canyons or in a side canyon that has been fenced off so the stock can roam freely.
- Spring: Sheep are brought into the canyons for the lambing season because the more-sheltered campsites provide greater protection for the newborn. Also, grasses in the canyon bottomlands ripen earlier than those on the rims of the Peninsula.
- Summer: As spring runoff through the canyons subsides, water becomes more difficult to come by in the lower reaches of the canyons. Livestock are moved either to other locations within the canyons or back up onto the rims or the Peninsula. In the past, a few families had summer sheep camps located as far as east as the Chuska Mountains.
- Autumn: With the cooler weather during the harvest season, springs and seeps in the canyons begin to flow, and water is more available. Livestock are moved back onto canyon pasturage, now replenished by a summer's respite from grazing. Often, livestock are allowed to forage for several days in the fields after the harvest is completed."
(adapted from Andrews 1985:160 as quoted in Andrews 1991:53-54).
Nowadays, canyon residents depend on trucks to get them to their fields and have no ability to annually choose their field locations, because land claims have become extremely restricted and all of the arable land has already been claimed. Furthermore, this area has been reduced by lateral and vertical erosion - from 186 fields in the late 1800s to 128 fields in 1980-1981 (Andrews 1991:55-57).
| Number of | Acreage | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fields in | Food Crops | Feed Crops | ||||||
| Year | Production | Irrigated | Dry-farmed | Irrigated | Dry-farmed | Grazing | Total Fenced | Unfenced |
| 1935 | 120 | 71.0 | 239.0 | 31.0 | 3.0 | 275.0 | 862.0 | 110.5 |
| (21%) | (69%) | (9%) | (1%) | |||||
| 1955 | 134 | 76.0 | 241.0 | 37.0 | 4.8 | 262.0 | 935.5 | 33.0 |
| (21%) | (67%) | (10%) | (1%) | |||||
| 1980-1981 | 128 | 38.5 | 181.0 | 32.0 | 2.0 | 390.0 | 938.0 | 7.5 |
| (15%) | (71%) | (13%) | (1%) | |||||
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Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate percentage of total cultivated acreage. (Table adapted from Andrews 1991:57)
Andrews summarizes the main points of her article thus:
"Matrilineal inheritance of fields was expected to decrease over time as the impact of wage labor and environmental change altered the importance of agriculture in the subsistence base and diminished the agricultural productivity potential of some canyon land… When inheritance data from the study areas a unit are combined, matrilineal transfers represent 49 percent of the total, and there was a slight, but not significant, decline over time in the occurrence of matrilineal transfers as compared with nonmatrilineal transfers." (1991:63).
Common-pool Resource Areas
One type of land tenure utilized by hunter-gatherer societies is the common-pool resource (CPR) area. A common-pool resource (CPR) area is a region that is utilized by several distinct ethnic groups contemporaneously and collectively. There are three main factors that play into the creation of a CPR area: the cost versus benefit of claiming sole possession of the area, the use of the area as an environmental risk buffer zone during food shortages, and utilization of the area to buffer against social conflict between differing groups.
A locale may be utilized as a CPR area if the resources within the region lack predictability and are sparsely situated across the landscape. In this instance, the costs associated with perimeter defense may outweigh the benefits of actively defending a large expanse. A social boundary defense may attempt to govern the region, however the variable resources and harsh environment may make this option futile. If the cost/benefit ratio is not favorable, then a CPR system will likely develop.
The second reason for the development of a CPR arrangement is to buffer against environmental risk. If an area lacks an abundant resource base to support a viable population then a CPR area might develop to allow groups occasional access to resources outside their usual territory during times of economic hardship, such as drought and famine. This mechanism to reduce environmental risk would allow groups unimpeded access to more resources.
The creation of a common-pool resource area may arise to buffer against inter-group social conflict. Keeping a large expanse of land between differing groups would help to reduce the frequency of contact between the groups, which would in turn reduce the chance of social friction. When certain cultures increase their power militarily and their population size, smaller neighboring groups may choose to create a CPR area that would keep a buffer area between themselves and their more powerful neighbors. A CPR area could also be utilized as a place for the weaker group to flee when attacked.
Groups who lived in the Great Basin utilized the Fort Irwin area of southeastern California as a common-pool resource area. This geographic region is approximately 15,000 square kilometers in size and consists of a desert environment with sparse, seasonally variable flora and fauna. Extreme temperature variation and high variability in precipitation accompany this harsh environment. Below is a map indicating the location of the Fort Irwin area and the Native American groups in the surrounding terrain.
Anthropological, archaeological, and ethnohistoric evidence has been encountered which support the assertion that the Fort Irwin area represented a CPR system of land tenure. Three main lines of support, as evidenced through the aforementioned means, are illuminated in seasonality, the distribution of ceramics, obsidian, and shell remnants, as well as comparative ethnographic land tenure strategies within the Great Basin. These factors, as well as population stability within groups in the Great Basin, similar demographics between those populations who use the area, and similar inter-tribal technological systems among the groups supports the contention that small diverse groups utilized the Fort Irwin area sporadically during the spring as a common-pool resource area.
Common-pool resource areas are demonstrated in places other than the Great Basin of the United States of America. Ethnographers have witnessed this land tenure system employed in Australia by the Pintupi Aborigines, the Kalahari Desert among the Ju/'hoansi, the Yanomamo of South America, and the Mbuti of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
